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I.  PART I 
  Introduction 
The patient entered the hospital suffering from severe cardiogenic shock.1 His 
heart had deteriorated; each breath became a greater labor.  Immediate surgery was 
necessary to repair a ruptured mitral valve2 – a complicated procedure with the level 
of physical atrophy.  
For seventeen hours, Dr. Sandu3 struggled to replace the leaking valve.4  When 
these efforts failed, he rushed the patient to another hospital and placed him on an 
artificial heart.5  The entire ordeal took twenty-four grueling hours to complete; 
however, these exertions were in vain.  Several days later the patient succumbed to 
his condition.  Dr. Sandu personally offered his condolences to the family.6 
A year later, Dr. Sandu opened his mail to discover that he would be embroiled in 
a very different struggle.  The family of the decedent had sued for malpractice.  The 
news shook Dr. Sandu.  He had surpassed every conceivable standard of medical 
care but now found himself fighting for his professional life. “I went through hell,” 
he would say.7       
Dr. Sandu soon learned the plaintiff had employed a “hired gun” to support its 
claim.8  The expert practiced the barest amount of surgery, enough to maintain an 
active license.9  The “hired gun” then devoted the remainder of his practice to selling 
                                                                
1Cardiogenic shock is a life threatening reduction of blood flow to the body caused by 
damage to the heart’s ability to function.  EUGENE BRAUNWALD, BRAUNWALD HEART DISEASE 
- TEXTBOOK OF CARDIOVASCULAR MEDICINE 569 (4th ed. 1992). Because blood transports 
essential substrates, such as oxygen, a severe reduction in blood flow results in an insufficient 
supply of these essential substrates, resulting in a failure of the body’s vital organ systems.  Id.  
2The mitral valve is the inlet valve to the main pumping chamber of the heart.  This valve 
closes the pumping chamber during each heartbeat.  LEONARD S. LILLY, PATHOPHYSIOLOGY OF 
HEART DISEASE 3 (1st ed. 1993).  A rupture to the mitral valve prevents the chamber from 
properly closing.  Without the chamber closing, contraction of the heart will send blood 
flowing in both directions rather than forward into the body.  This condition was the main 
contributing factor to the cardiogenic shock threatening the patient’s life.  Id.  
3The following narrative is based on actual events experienced by a respected 
cardiovascular surgeon.  Because the physician preferred to remain anonymous, subsequent 
citations will refer to him as “Anonymous,” and the text will refer to him as “Doctor Sandu.” 
4Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Cardiovascular Surgeon, in Cleveland, Ohio (Oct. 
18, 2006) (on file with the author). 
5Id. 
6Id.  
7Id.  
8Id.  
9Id. 
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his testimony to the highest bidder.10  He knew what he was doing was wrong, and 
refused to look Dr. Sandu in the eye throughout the trial.11    
It immediately became apparent that the “expert” had no idea what he was 
talking about.12  The plaintiff had hired a third rate doctor to sustain a spurious claim.  
According to Dr. Sandu, by the time cross–examination had concluded, the so called 
expert looked completely incompetent.13   
The lawsuit has carved an indelible scar into Dr. Sandu’s personal and 
professional life.  It has “left a very bad feeling inside me,” he said.  “You loose faith 
in people . . . [y]ou become a different person.”14  Prior to the lawsuit, Dr. Sandu 
“never blinked to take on surgery.”15 Now he hesitates before accepting cases that 
could expose him to liability.16  
The experience of Dr. Sandu is far from unique.  A recent Harvard study revealed 
that “only seventeen percent, or approximately one out of six, of medical malpractice 
civil actions actually filed [within the test state], appeared to actually involve a 
negligent injury.”17  Medical malpractice litigation is replete with examples of “hired 
guns” who testify “not because the statements are an honest, scientific assessment of 
the case at hand,” but because they have been paid enough to make the statement.18 
For some doctors, expert medical testimony “is their business, and their testimony 
can be bought and paid for.”19  
The issue is exacerbated because many of these alleged experts no longer 
actively practice medicine20 and frequently testify in arenas far from their areas of 
expertise.21  The consequence is that a statement of opinion gets presented as fact to a 
jury which has no way of knowing that it is contrary to any scientific or medical 
standard.22  This paid testimony furnishes a breeding ground for frivolous lawsuits 
and nurtures the expanding malpractice crisis.   
                                                                
10Id.  
11Id. 
12Id.  
13Id. 
14Id. 
15Id.  
16Id.  
17James A. Comodeca et al., Killing the Golden Goose by Evaluating Medical Care 
Through the Retroscope: Tort Reform From the Defense Perspective, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
207, 212 (2006) (citing David M. Studdert, Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283 
(2004)).  The study confined its inquiry to the state of New York. 
18Noah Schaffer, Medical Experts on the Radar, 1 MASS. MED. L. REP. 1, 14 (2006). 
19Id. at 1. 
20Id.  
21Id. 
22Id. at 14. 
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Ohio attempted to solve this problem with the passage of Ohio Revised Code 
section 2743.43,23 hereinafter referred to as the “medical expert statute.”  The 
legislation fundamentally alters Ohio rules governing medical expert testimony in 
two essential ways.  First, the law requires that an expert dedicate “three-fourths of 
[his or her] time to the active practice of medicine or surgery.”24 Second, the law 
mandates an expert practice “in the same or substantially similar [medical] specialty 
as the defendant” in order to be considered competent to testify against him.25  
These legislative enactments appear to clash with Ohio Rules of Evidence 
regarding the competency of expert witnesses, which requires that medical experts 
devote only one-half of their time to active clinical practice.26  At first glance, the 
statute appears to violate the Ohio Constitution, which provides the Ohio Supreme 
Court with the sole power to promulgate rules of evidence and court procedure.27  
However, this assessment is incorrect.  The same Constitutional provision 
empowering the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure prohibits the Court 
from creating rules that infringe upon substantive rights.28 
                                                                
23OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.43(A)(2) (West 2006). 
(A) No person shall be deemed competent to give expert testimony on the liability 
issues in a medical claim . . . unless . . .  2) Such person devotes three-fourths of the 
person's professional time to the active clinical practice of medicine or surgery, 
osteopathic medicine and surgery, or podiatric medicine and surgery, or to its 
instruction in an accredited university. Id. 
24Id.  
25Christopher M. Ernst, et al., Baldwin’s Oh. Prac. Tort  L. § 8:22 (2006).  
26OHIO R. EVID. 601(D).  Note that the Ohio Rules of Evidence are devoid of a parallel 
requirement that the medical expert practice in the same or substantially the same specialty as 
the defendant: 
Every person is competent to be a witness except . . . (D) A person giving expert 
testimony on the issue of liability in any claim asserted in any civil action against a 
physician, podiatrist, or hospital arising out of the diagnosis, care, or treatment of any 
person by a physician or podiatrist, unless the person testifying is licensed to practice 
medicine and surgery, osteopathic medicine and surgery, or podiatric medicine and 
surgery by the state medical board or by the licensing authority of any state, and 
unless the person devotes at least one-half of his or her professional time to the active 
clinical practice in his or her field of licensure, or to its instruction in an accredited 
school. This division shall not prohibit other medical professionals who otherwise are 
competent to testify under these rules from giving expert testimony on the appropriate 
standard of care in their own profession in any claim asserted in any civil action 
against a physician, podiatrist, medical professional, or hospital arising out of the 
diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.   
Id.  
27ERNST ET AL., supra note 27. 
28 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B). 
(B) The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all 
courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive 
right. Proposed rules shall be filed by the court, not later than the fifteenth day of 
January, with the clerk of each house of the general assembly during a regular session 
thereof, and amendments to any such proposed rules may be so filed not later than the 
first day of May in that session. Such rules shall take effect on the following first day 
of July, unless prior to such day the general assembly adopts a concurrent resolution of 
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Rules governing the competency of medical experts inherently impact substantive 
rights in two major ways.  First, they impact the right to a trial by jury.29  Second, 
these rules infringe upon the right to access a court of law.30 As a result, the Rule of 
Evidence impermissibly infringes upon substantive rights in violation of Ohio 
Constitutional limitations on rules of practice and procedure.31  Furthermore, even if 
the evidentiary rule governing medical experts is not nullified, certain provisions of 
the medical expert statute are still valid as acceptable extensions to the rules of court 
procedure.32  
This article will explore the constitutionality of Ohio Revised Code section 
2743.43 in light of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.  Part I introduces the medical expert 
issue in the state of Ohio.  Part II will be divided into two sections.  Section A 
explains the standard of care for malpractice claims that requires an expert medical 
explanation.  Section B provides background on the evolution of the standard of care 
in the state of Ohio.  Part III will be divided into three sections. Section A explores 
the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 5(B). Section B explores the Ohio Rules 
of Evidence.  Finally, Section C explores Ohio Revised Code section 2743.43.  Part 
IV will be divided into two sections examining the constitutionality of the Ohio 
Rules of Evidence, ultimately arguing that the Ohio statutory provision must control 
because rules of evidence regulating the competency of medical experts 
impermissibly infringe upon the substantive rights of tort victims.  Section A 
addresses the three-fourths requirement of Ohio Revised Code section 2743.43 and is 
divided into five subparts that examine the substantive nature of rules governing 
medical experts.  Section B addresses the same or substantially the same clause of 
the Revised Code section 2743.43. Part V will conclude the article. 
II.  PART II 
A.  The Professional Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Litigation 
Medical malpractice is a specialized branch of the negligence tree.33 Under this 
branch, physicians are not held to the standard of the reasonably prudent person.34  
                                                           
disapproval. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect 
after such rules have taken effect. 
Id. 
29 See infra pp. 141-42.  
30 See infra pp. 142-44. 
31See discussion infra Parts IV.A.5, IV.A.6. 
32See infra pp. 145-48. 
33DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 631 (2000). “The tort action for medical malpractice 
is a negligence action, accompanied by the usual rules attendant to such actions.  The plaintiff 
must prove negligence, causation and damages”.  Id.  However, because physicians stand in a 
special relationship of trust to their patients, “the duty of care owed by medical and other 
professionals is usually expressed in and applied in a special way.”  Id.  See also Fred L. 
Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 185, 191  (2004);  
JAMES T. O’REILLY, OHIO PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE §14:3 (2006) (“An Action for medical 
malpractice is a negligence action.”).  
34DOBBS, supra note 33, at 633.   
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Medical professionals cannot be held to this standard “because the profession of 
medicine . . . has a very distinct and separate body of knowledge that is considered 
beyond the grasp of the average ‘reasonable person.’”35 Instead, doctors are required 
to employ “the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed by members of the 
profession in good standing”36 in a similar practice and under similar 
circumstances.37 Simply put, this professional standard of care requires “what is 
customary and usual” within the practice of medicine.38   
Because the applicable standard relies so heavily on custom, the medical 
profession has the privilege of “setting [its] own legal standards of conduct, merely 
by adopting [its] own practices,” a privilege “emphatically denied to other groups.”39  
The rationale for this concession is “the layman’s ignorance of medical matters and 
the necessity of expert testimony”40 to explain it.  Because doctors obtain a highly 
specialized subset of knowledge, an expert is essential to explain the appropriate 
standard of care.41 A medical malpractice claim cannot be pursued without this 
expert.42   
This standard does not mean that a doctor is required to be perfect.43  It does not 
even mean that a doctor must be average.44  Rather, a doctor is judged only against 
members of the medical community who are in good professional standing.  Of these 
members, only “the minimum common skill [… is] looked to.”45  If a doctor has 
achieved a special degree of skill, however, the standard will be the skill possessed 
by members of that specialty.46  On the other end of the spectrum, there is not a 
                                                                
35Cohen, supra note 33, at 191. 
36W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 187 (5th ed. 1984). 
37See Cross v. Huttenlochler, 440 A.2d 952, 954 (Conn. 1981) (“A physician is under a 
duty to his patient to exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence which physicians in the 
same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in similar cases.”) 
38KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 189. 
39Id. 
40Id.  
41Cohen, supra note 33, at 191. 
42DOBBS, supra note 33, at 633.  “The professional standard differs from the reasonable 
care standard also in that courts traditionally require the malpractice plaintiff to establish the 
professional standard by expert testimony.  No such category-wide rule applies in ordinary 
negligence cases.” Id.  
43Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking Those 
Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 702 (2002). 
44KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 187. 
45Id. See also Shevak v. United States, 528 F. Supp. 427, 432 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (“[A] 
doctor does not have to show that he performed at any ‘ultimate or maximum’ level of care, 
but only that he conducted himself above or equal to the minimum standard of accepted 
professional practice.”) 
46KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 187.  
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similar rule for neophytes to the medical profession.47  A “hospital . . . [is] obliged to 
provide physicians who . . . meet that standard” 48 of care found throughout the 
medical community. The standard is always a floor, never a ceiling.49  
Traditionally, courts made allowances for the “type of community in which the 
physician carrie[d] on his practice . . . [A] country doctor would not be expected to 
have the equipment, facilities, libraries, contacts opportunities for learning, or 
experience afforded large cities.”50  In effect, the rule disqualified those experts who 
could not demonstrate a familiarity “with the standard of care in the relevant 
locality.”51  With the advent of electronic communication, advances in medical 
procedures have been placed at the fingertips of even the most pioneering physician.  
As a result, most courts have “abandon[ed] a fixed locality rule in favor of treating 
the community as merely one factor” in determining the standard of care.52  Still 
other jurisdictions have abandoned the locality rule “outright … [applying] a general 
national standard” in all medical malpractice cases.53  
The utilization of custom fundamentally alters the role of the jury in medical 
malpractice litigation.54  In typical negligence cases, the jury is asked to assess the 
reasonableness of a defendant’s actions.55  In malpractice cases, the jury is asked 
whether the doctor adhered to the custom employed by other physicians, a custom 
that can only be explained by a medical expert.  The jury’s “assessment of whether 
the custom is reasonable or unreasonable is irrelevant [so long as] the defendant 
followed that custom.” 56    
Surprisingly, even experts can disagree about the proper standard of care in a 
particular circumstance.57  Where there are competing schools of medical thought, 
                                                                
47Id. See also McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[T]he duty of 
care owed to the patient does not vary according to the doctor’s individual knowledge or 
education”). 
48McBride, 462 F.2d at 74. 
49KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 187.  
50Id. at 187-88.  Under the locality rule, “[i]f a town’s six doctors all ignored helpful new 
drugs for treatment of the plaintiff’s condition; none of them would be guilty of medical 
malpractice for failing to prescribe such a drug when it was needed.”  DOBBS, supra note 30, 
at 635.   
51Cramm et al., supra note 43, at 706. 
52KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 188.  Courts now examine “the medical community in 
the same or similar localities, in the state, or in the nation as a whole for appropriate 
standards.”  DOBBS, supra note 33, at 636-37.  If a physician is a board certified medical 
specialist, the standard is that of the standard adhered to by that specialty. Id.  
53KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 188.   
54DOBBS, supra note 33, at 633.  Because the professional standard asks only whether the 
physician conformed to the relevant custom, the physician cannot be found negligent so long 
as he followed that custom. See also Cramm et al., supra note 43, at 702. 
55Cramm et al., supra note 43, at 702. 
56Id. at 702-03. 
57KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 187. 
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the physician is judged “according to the tenets of the school the doctor professed to 
follow.”58  This does not mean that any individual can set up shop and establish a 
school of medical thought free of liability.59  A “school” must be recognized by 
others in the medical community.60  It must possess definitive principals.61  It must be 
in line with “a respectable minority of the profession.”62  
As a practical matter, the school of thought doctrine operates as an affirmative 
defense.63  The defendant retains the burden of proving that a second school exists 
and that he or she adhered to it.64  Its invocation reduces the trial into a battle of the 
experts, with the plaintiff attempting to prove “that no such school exists, that it 
represents a fringe element, or that the second school . . . has become obsolete.”65 It 
is left, oddly enough, to the jury to trudge through this medical marsh land and select 
the applicable custom to which the doctor should have adhered. 
B.  The Standard of Care for Medical Malpractice in the State of Ohio 
To establish a medical malpractice claim in the State of Ohio, a plaintiff must 
prove three essential elements.66  First, the “applicable standard of care [must be 
established] usually through expert testimony.”67 Second, the plaintiff must “show a 
negligent failure on the part of the defendant to render treatment in conformity with 
the standard of care.”68  Finally, the plaintiff must “demonstrate that the resulting 
injury was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence.”69  
                                                                
58Id.  When there are two schools of medical thought, a physician is free to adhere to 
either custom without fear of incurring liability.  DOBBS, supra note 33, at 633.   
59KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 187. 
60Id. 
61Id. 
62Id. 
63Cramm et al., supra note 43, at 705. 
64Id. 
65Id.  
66Promen v. Ward, 591 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the judgment 
was against the manifest weight of evidence because the jury instructions emphasized the 
standard of care for a negligence action, not a medical malpractice action -  which is not 
determined by blind adherence to the standard practices within a given specialty); see also 
Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673, 675 (Ohio 1976). 
67Promen, 591 N.E.2d at 815. See also JAMES T. O’REILLY, OHIO PERSONAL INJURY 
PRACTICE § 14:7 (2006).  “The standard of care ordinarily must be established by expert 
testimony unless the conduct is within the common knowledge and experience of jurors.” Id.  
68Promen, 591 N.E.2d at 815. 
69Id. See also JAMES T. O’REILLY, OHIO PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE § 14:11 (2006).  
“Proximate cause is a happening or event that, as a natural and continuous sequence, produces 
an injury without which the result would not have occurred.” Id.  In medical malpractice 
litigation, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s 
negligence probably caused the injury – defined as “more likely than not,” or greater than fifty 
percent.  Id. 
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Ohio has arguably eschewed the custom-based professional standard of care, 
described above, in favor of the traditional reasonable prudent person inquiry.70  This 
shift alters the landscape of medical malpractice jurisprudence in Ohio by permitting 
the plaintiff to reach a jury simply by establishing “that the defendant’s care did not 
meet the standards of a reasonable physician.”71 Under this system of medical 
liability, breach of custom no longer serves as a prerequisite to medical malpractice, 
and adherence cannot establish a complete defense.72  Despite the revocation of 
custom in Ohio, the appropriate standard of care to which a physician should have 
adhered must still be proven through the use of expert testimony.73 
The shift from a custom based inquiry occurred when the Ohio Supreme Court 
refused to blindly follow the appropriate medical convention in malpractice claims.74  
In Hall v. Ault, a surgical team inadvertently left a sponge inside the patient’s chest 
cavity.75  The offending physician relied upon the “uncontroverted”76 custom of 
delegating the sponge count to nurses as a complete defense to the action against 
him.77   
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, rejected this stance. 78  Custom, they said, 
could not serve as a complete defense to a charge of medical negligence: “[t]he 
overwhelming weight of authority supports the general rule that customary methods 
of conduct do not furnish a test that is conclusive, or fix a standard.”79  Physicians in 
medical malpractice litigation should always be compared to an ordinary physician 
under similar circumstances.80  A medical professional, therefore, would be held to 
the same reasonableness standard applied to every other tortfeasor. 
Ault produced an ambiguous state of affairs concerning the sweep of the court’s 
ruling.81  Subsequent case law clarified the Ohio Supreme Court’s intention to 
jettison custom from the medical malpractice calculation.82   
                                                                
70Phillip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the 
Millenium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 175-78 (2000). 
71Id. at 177. 
72Id.  
7367 OHIO JUR. 3D Malpractice § 45 (2006). 
74See Hall v. Ault, 164 N.E. 518 (Ohio 1928) (holding in action for negligence, conformity 
to a custom cannot furnish a test that is conclusive or controlling, but conformity is a 
circumstance to be weighed or considered by the trier of fact). 
75Id. at 519. 
76Id. at 521. 
77Id. 
78Id. at 522. 
79Id. at 523. 
80Id. at Syllabus. 
81Courts were uncertain whether Ault should be limited to its specific facts or whether it 
spelled the death knell of custom based medical malpractice. 
82See Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ohio 1976) (holding in part that the 
standard of care in a medical malpractice action is the performance of an action or omitting to 
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In Bruni v. Tatsumi, the Ohio Supreme Court further developed the standard that 
would serve as the foundation for all future medical malpractice litigation.  In order 
to establish liability, a plaintiff must show, “by a preponderance of evidence83 that a 
physician “did some particular thing or things that physicians and surgeons . . . of 
ordinary skill, care and diligence would not have done under the same or similar 
circumstances.”84  Thus in Ohio, “[w]hile customary methods and practices are 
highly relevant in determining the standard of care conformity to a recognized 
practice is not conclusive.”85  A jury is to consider “customary practices as evidence 
of the standard of care . . . but ultimately the jury must determine whether the 
method or practice used by defendant was reasonable under the circumstances.”86  
Ohio has also partitioned medical cases based on the complexity of the malpractice 
claim.  The first class of cases involves medical matters outside the comprehension 
of the average layman. These cases require reliance upon expert guidance because 
“[t]here can be no other guide.”87  Failure to secure an expert is fatal to a plaintiff’s 
case and “there is no evidence . . . to be submitted to the jury.”88   
The second class of cases occurs when “the lack of skill or care of the physician 
and surgeon is so apparent as to be within the comprehension of laymen and requires 
only common knowledge and experience to understand and judge it.”89  Unlike a 
complex medical malpractice case, a plaintiff will be able to reach a jury without 
obtaining a medical expert.  The litigant will rely instead upon the jurors’ common 
knowledge and experience.90 
                                                           
perform an action that a physician or surgeon of ordinary skill, care and diligence would have 
done or not done under similar circumstances). 
83Id. at syllabus. 
84Id. at 676.  The test in its entirety reads as follows:  
whether the physician, in the performance of his service, either did some particular 
thing or things that physicians and surgeons, in that medical community, of ordinary 
skill, care and diligence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances, 
or failed or omitted to do some particular thing or things which physicians and 
surgeons of ordinary skill, care and diligence would have done under the same or 
similar circumstances. He is required to exercise the average degree of skill, care and 
diligence exercised by members of the same medical specialty community in similar 
situations. 
Id. 
85Promen v. Ward, 591 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (citing Ault v. Hall, 164 
N.E. 518, (para. two of syllabus Ohio 1928); see also 67 OHIO JUR. 3D Malpractice § 44 
(2006). “Customary methods or conduct do not furnish a test that is conclusive or controlling 
on the question of negligence.”  67 OHIO JUR. 3D Malpractice § 44 (2006). 
86Id.  
87Bruni, 346 N.E.2d at 677. 
88Id.  
89Id.  
90Berdyck v. Shinde, 613 N.E.2d 1014, 1022 (Ohio 1993). “In a negligence action 
involving conduct within the common knowledge and experience of jurors an expert is not 
required.” Id.  The classic example of a case in which a medical expert will not be required to 
reach a jury occurs when the physician leaves a foreign object inside the cavity of a patient.  
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Finally, as mentioned above, many jurisdictions have discarded the locality rule 
in light of the shrinking information divide created by modern forms of 
communication.91  Ohio is a member of the growing consensus considering the 
locality rule to be “antiquated and unrealistic.”92  As a result, the standard of care 
owed to a patient is that which is adhered to by the particular community in which 
the physician specializes, not the particular community in which the physician 
practices; “[g]eographical conditions or circumstances do not control either the 
standard of the specialist’s care or the competence of the expert’s testimony.”93 
III.  PART III 
A.  The Constitution of Ohio, Article IV, Sec. 5(B) 
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution “was the linchpin of the . . .  Modern Courts” 
movement.94  Post World War II America witnessed an explosion in litigation, 
glutting the court system and grinding its administration to a halt.95  Prior to Article 
IV’s enactment, a haphazard amalgam of common law, chancery procedure and 
statutory legislation dictated court room procedure.96  Article IV, referred to as the 
Modern Courts Amendment, centralized and simplified this arcane system, placing 
the rules governing practice and procedure firmly within the ambit of the Ohio 
Supreme Court.  
Under Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court 
is empowered to oversee the “rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of 
the state.”97 This authority is plenary, circumscribed only by the provision that 
procedural rules may not restrict substantive rights.98 A rule that impinges on a 
                                                           
No expert would be necessary in this instance because the negligence of some party is self 
evident.  
91It should also be noted that Ohio follows the “’two schools of thought doctrine’ . . . [as 
a] defense in medical malpractice actions.”  JAMES T. O’REILLY, OHIO PERSONAL INJURY 
PRACTICE § 14:16 (2006).  The doctrine operates as an affirmative defense to a charge of 
medical malpractice. Id.  Under the “schools of thought doctrine,” the defendant has the 
burden of producing evidence that there were other methods of diagnosis and treatment for the 
particular medical condition.  Id.  In using this defense, the defendant attempts to establish that 
“[t]he mere fact that an alternative method was used is not proof of negligence.”  Id.   The jury 
must then decide whether the procedure used conformed “with the standard of care required of 
a practitioner in the defendant’s field of practice.” Id.  
92Bruni, 346 N.E.2d at 679. See also James T. O’Reilly, OHIO PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE 
§ 14:6 (2006). 
93Bruni, 346 N.E.2d at 679. 
94OHIO CONST. art. IV cmt. 1990. 
95Id. 
96Id. 
97OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B). 
98Id. 
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substantive right is impermissible.99 Thus rules promulgated under Section 5(B) 
supersede conflicting statutes affecting practice and procedure in Ohio courts, but 
not statutes affecting fundamental rights.100  Despite these restrictions upon 
legislative function, Ohio lawmakers retain the authority to enact “statutes which 
supplement or complement the rules” of practice or procedure. 101  
B.  The Ohio Rule of Evidence 601 
Pursuant to the authority granted under Article IV, Section 5(B), the Ohio 
Supreme Court enacted Rule 601. This Rule of Evidence contains a special provision 
governing the competency of expert witnesses testifying in medical malpractice 
litigation.102 Under Rule 601(D), a medical expert must devote “at least one-half of 
his or her professional time to the active clinical practice in his or her field of 
licensure, or its instruction in an accredited school.” 103 This requirement differs from 
the medical expert statute, which requires a medical expert to devote three-fourths of 
his or her time to the active clinical practice of medicine.104  
C.  Ohio Revised Code § 2743.43 
Prior to the creation of Rule 601(D), the Ohio legislature had already weighed 
into the Tort Reform debate.  In 1979, it passed the medical expert statute to regulate 
the testimony of medical witnesses.105  In its initial conception, the medical expert 
statute required a specialist to “devote three-fourths of [his or her] time to the active 
clinical practice of medicine.”106  In 2004, the Ohio legislature appended the statute, 
adding a requirement that an expert practice “in the same or substantially similar 
specialty as the defendant.”107  In adopting this amendment, the legislature implicitly 
ratified the three-fourths requirement for medical expert competency.108 
                                                                
99Id.  
100OHIO CONST. art. IV cmt. 1990. 
101Id. 
102OHIO R. EVID. 601 (D). 
103Id.  
104See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.43 (A)(2) (West 2006). 
105Id. The statute became effective 7-28-75, § 2743.43. 
106Id. § 2743.43 (A)(2). 
107Id.  The statute does create an exception for an expert who practices in a different 
specialty if he or she can show “that the standards of care and practice in the two specialties 
are similar and the expert has substantial familiarity between the specialties.” Id.  
108H.R. 215, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess (Ohio 2004).  The legislature also added the 
requirement that:  
[a] witness . . . is not competent to give expert testimony in a medical claim, pursuant 
to the act, unless the witness is certified in a medical specialty by a board recognized 
by the American Board of Medical Specialties . . . as having acknowledged expertise 
and training directly related to the particular health care matter at issue. 
Id. 
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IV.  PART IV 
A.  The Three Fourths Requirement 
1.  Introduction 
From its inception, the medical expert statute controlled the competency of 
experts in medical liability claims.109  However, pursuant to its authority under the 
Ohio Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated R. 601(D) in 1990, sixteen years 
after the enactment of the medical expert statute.110  As previously mentioned, this 
new rule appears to reduce the requirements under the medical expert statute from 
three-fourths of a physician’s professional time to one-half.111  This effort results in 
conflicts between the Rules of Evidence and portions of the medical expert statute 
that refers to competency.  Determining which provision controls requires an inquiry 
into: 1) the supplemental nature of the medical expert statute, 2) the distinction 
between substantive and procedural rights, 3) substantive rights under Article IV, 
Section 5(B), 4) the impact of competency rules on the right to a jury trial, and 5) the 
right to access a court of law. 
2.  The medical expert statute as a supplement to Rule 601(D) 
Because the medical expert statute requires that an expert devote more time to the 
practice of medicine, the three-fourths requirement could be viewed as a supplement 
to the rules of evidence.  Under constitutional rules of construction, the legislature is 
permitted to provide additional requirements to any rule of court procedure.112  
However, because the Ohio Supreme Court enacted Rule 601(D) years after the 
medical expert statute had already become effective, this construction is doubtful.  A 
statutory provision can hardly be deemed to supplement a procedural rule that has 
been subsequently adopted to displace it. 
This skepticism is confirmed by the staff notes accompanying Rule 601(D). The 
notes expressly state, “[t]he rule as adopted supersedes R.C. 2743.43.”113  Therefore, 
the Advisory Committee that proposed Rule 601(D) clearly intended for it to 
supplant the medical expert statute.114  
Subsequent case law confirms this interpretation.115  The Ohio courts that have 
interpreted Rule 601(D) have consistently held that medical experts must devote one-
                                                                
109OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.43 (West 2006). The statute became effective 7-28-75. 
Id. 
110OHIO R. EVID. 601(D).  The amendment became effective 7-1-91. Id.  
111Id. 
112See discussion supra Part III, Section A for the applicable rules of construction under 
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B). 
113Ohio Evid. R. 601(D), 1980 staff note.  
114See discussion infra Part IV, Section B.  
115It is important to note that no Ohio court has expressly held that Rule 601(D) 
supersedes the medical expert statute. 
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half of their professional time to the active practice of medicine.116  In Fahey v. 
Abouhossein, 117 for instance, the court of appeals upheld the disqualification of an 
expert witness under Rule 601(D).  While the witness had extensive medical 
publications, he had not devoted one-half of his time to the active clinical practice of 
medicine as required under the Ohio Rules of Evidence.  Therefore, he could not 
testify on behalf of the plaintiff.118   
In another Ohio case interpreting the competency of a medical expert, the court 
based its decision primarily on the requirements under Rule 601(D).119  In Aldridge v. 
Gardner, the court of appeals, while noting the interplay among the medical expert 
statute and Rule 601(D),120 held that the medical expert was competent to testify.121  
The expert, while only devoting twenty percent of his present time to the active 
clinical practice of medicine, had clearly met Rule 601(D)’s requirements through 
the knowledge accrued over twenty years of practicing medicine.122  
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the three-fourths requirement of the 
medical expert statute, as a rule of court procedure, is clearly displaced by Rule 
601(D).  However, the Supreme Court’s power to adopt rules of procedure under 
Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution is expressly circumscribed by its 
effect on substantive rights. Specifically, procedural rules “shall not abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right,”123 the result being that the efficacy of the three-
fourths requirement hinges on its status as a rule governing substantive rights.   
                                                                
116See, e.g., Fahey v. Abouhossein, No. 17215, 1999 WL 89737, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 
12, 1999) (“The purpose of . . . Evid.R. 601(D) is ‘to preclude testimony by the physician who 
earns his living or spends much of his time testifying against his fellows as a professional 
witness . . .’” (quoting McCrory v. State, 423 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ohio 1981)); Williams v. 
Reynolds Road Surgical Center, Ltd., No. L-02-1144, 2004 WL 628972, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. 
App. March 31, 2004) (holding the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of medical 
expert who devoted 60 to 70 percent of his professional time on “programs and other things”); 
Aldridge v. Gardner, 825 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding a physician who 
spends eighty percent of his time working for insurance companies was engaged in the active 
clinical practice of medicine under OHIO R. EVID. 601(D) because he had devoted twenty 
years to the clinical practice of medicine and devoted the remainder of his time to the clinical 
practice of medicine); Cunningham v. St. Alexis Hosp. Med. Ctr., 758 N.E.2d 188, 197-98 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding a physician who spends approximately two-thirds to seventy-
five percent of his time doing research is not competent to testify under OHIO R. EVID. 
601(D)); Smith v. Sass, Friedman & Assocs., Inc., No. 81953,  2004 WL 229515 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Feb. 5, 2004) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a witness 
competent when he devoted fifty percent of his time to patient care). 
117Fahey, 1999 WL 89737, at *2. 
118Id.  (holding that rationale behind competency rules for medical experts was “to exclude 
the testimony of the ‘hired gun,’ a professional witness whose actual specialty is testimony 
instead of treatment. Such witnesses . . . lack the current basis of experience  . . . necessary to 
form a judgment truly helpful to the trier of fact.”). 
119See Aldridge, 825 N.E.2d 201. 
120Id. at 205. 
121Id. at 206. 
122Id.  
123OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B). 
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3.  The Distinction Between Substantive and Procedural Rights 
A rule of court procedure that impacts a substantive right is impermissible under 
the Ohio Constitution.  The distinction between substantive and procedural rights is 
difficult to ascertain, though courts have attempted define the difference.124  
Generally speaking, a substantive law “creates duties, rights and obligations.”125  On 
the other hand, procedural statutes prescribe the methods of enforcing these rights or 
of obtaining redress.126   
Procedural statutes typically involve rules of practice or procedure and methods 
of court review.127  Substantive statutes, however, typically impair or take away 
vested rights,128 affect accrued substantive rights,129 impose new or additional 
burdens, duties, obligations or liabilities on individuals,130 create new rights,131 or 
give rise to or take away the right to sue or defend actions132 in a court of law.133   
4.  Substantive Rights under Article IV, Section 5(B) 
Historically, Ohio courts have been willing to recognize the substantive quality 
of legislation that conflicts with rules of court procedure under Article IV, section 
5(B).134  In Boyer v. Boyer, the trial court, after reviewing the documents submitted 
in a custody battle, determined both parents fit to raise their child.135  However, the 
court, empowered by a statutory provision in the Ohio Revised Code, awarded 
                                                                
124Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489, 497 (Ohio 1988) (superseded 
by statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (WEST 2007). 
125Kilbreath v. Rudy, 242 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Ohio 1968) (finding Ohio long-armed statues 
to be procedural in nature rather than substantive). 
126Id. 
127State ex rel. Slaughter v. Indus. Comm’n., 9 N.E.2d 505, 543-34 (Ohio 1937) (citing 
County of Miami v. City of Dayton, 110 N.E. 726, 728 (Ohio 1915). 
128See State ex rel. South Euclid v. Zangerle, 62 N.E.2d 160, 163 (Ohio 1945). 
129See In re Nevious 191 N.E.2d 166, 169-70 (Ohio 1963). 
130See Miller v. Hixson, 59 N.E. 749, 752 (Ohio 1901). 
131See Zangerle, 14 N.E.2d at 934. 
132See Smith v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 170 N.E. 637, 638 (Ohio 1930). 
133Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489, 496 (Ohio 1988). 
134See Boyer v. Boyer, 346 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio 1976) (holding that because OHIO R. CIV. P. 
75(P) abridges the statutory right provided under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (West 
2007).  The rule is invalid under the provisions of Section 5 of Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution), State v. Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 401, 404-05 (Ohio 1986) (holding in part that 
Rule 601(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence is superseded by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 
(West 2007), as to spousal privilege because §. 2945.42 codifies a substantive right because 
“the Rules of Evidence in Ohio are limited by Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution to procedural effect only”). But see Armstrong v. The Portsmith Times, No. 1259, 
1980 WL 351014, (at *2 Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1980) (“R.C. 2317.27 clearly does not create, 
define or regulate the substantive rights of parties”). 
135Boyer, 346 N.E.2d at 287. 
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custody to the child’s grandmother instead.136  The parents appealed, arguing that the 
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure only permitted such a maneuver upon a finding “that 
neither parent is a suitable person to have custody.”137    
The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that under the Modern Courts 
Amendment138 when “conflicts arise between the . . . [rules of procedure] and the 
statutory law, the rule will control the statute on matters of procedure and the statute 
will control on matters of substantive law.”139  The Court then acknowledged the 
substantive nature of the child custody statute.140  The law embodied the traditional 
power “of the courts to make the final determination of the best interests of [the] 
child in custody disputes,” 141 a fundamental power in family law jurisprudence. 
Under Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, the child custody statute 
as a substantive law must therefore control.142  The rule of procedure affecting child 
custody would be superseded where it conflicted with the substantive provisions of 
the statute.143    
Another decision addressing the interplay of the Ohio statutory provisions and 
the Rules of Evidence under Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution 
occurred in State v. Rahman.144  This case is particularly illuminating because it 
addressed, in part, a conflict between the competency of a witness under Rule 601 
and an Ohio statute codifying the spousal privilege.145  
In Rahman, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that Rule 601(B), which governs 
the competency of spouses,146 displaces all statutory provisions as a rule of court 
procedure.147  However, this sovereignty dissipates when it encroaches upon 
                                                                
136Id. 
137Id. at 288 (citing OHIO R. CIV. P.  75(P)).  Prior to its nullification, the rule required 
that: “If the court finds, with respect to any child under eighteen years of age, that neither 
parent is a suitable person to have custody, it may commit the child to any other relative of the 
child.”  Id. 
138The Modern Courts Amendment is a reference to Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution.  See discussion supra, Part III, Section A.  
139Boyer, 346 N.E.2d at 288. 
140Id. 
141Id. (citing Portage County Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6, 12 (Ohio 1974)). 
142Id.  
143Id.  
144State v. Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio 1986). 
145Id. at 403-06. The statute in question was OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (West 
2006). 
146OHIO R. EVID. 601(B) provides: “Every person is competent to be a witness except:  . . . 
(B) A spouse testifying against the other spouse charged with a crime except when either of 
the following applies: (1) a crime against the testifying spouse or a child of either spouse is 
charged; (2) the testifying spouse elects to testify.”  
Note the court addressed the competency of an expert under OHIO R. EVID. 601(B), not 
under OHIO R. EVID. 601(D), which governs the competency of medical experts. 
147Rahman, 492 N.E. 2d at 404. 
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fundamental, substantive rights.  The Ohio Supreme Court held that under Section 
5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, the statute codifying the spousal 
privilege148 superseded Rule 601(B)149 because the spousal privilege “create[d] a 
substantive right which [could] not be abridged”150 by any rule of court procedure.  
Under the Ohio Constitution, Rule 601(B) would be nullified when it impacted the 
fundamental privilege of spouses to be secure in their private communications.   
This discussion demonstrates that the Ohio Supreme Court has been receptive to 
recognizing the preemptive qualities of substantive rights under Article IV of the 
Ohio Constitution.  However, the Ohio Supreme Court has never directly addressed 
the substantive nature of the medical statute under the Modern Courts Amendment. 
The only instance in which the Ohio Supreme Court even discussed the qualities of 
the medical expert statute occurred obliquely in Denicola v. Providence Hospital.151   
Denicola involved a medical malpractice action initiated prior to the enactment 
of the medical expert statute.152  By the time the trial had convened, the legislature 
had passed the law regulating the competency of medical experts.153  Under the new 
statute’s stringent requirements, the witness could no longer be considered 
competent to testify.154  The defendant therefore objected to his continued 
participation in the trial.155  The trial court sustained the objection.156  Without a 
medical expert, the plaintiff’s claim had been effectively destroyed, and the judge 
granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.157   
The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, arguing that the 
application of the medical expert statute in the present case violated Article II, 
Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution.158  Article II, Section 28 prohibits the general 
assembly from enacting retroactive laws.159  The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this 
                                                                
148The spousal privilege prevents a husband or a wife from testifying “concerning a 
communication made by one to the other, or act done by either in the presence of the other 
during coverture, unless the communication was made or acted one in the known presence or 
hearing of a third person.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (West 2006). 
149Id. at 405. 
150Id.  
151See Denicola v. Providence Hosp., 387 N.E.2d 231 (Ohio 1979). 
152Id. at 233.  The statute became effective on July 28, 1975.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2743.43 (West 2006). 
153Denicola, 387 N.E.2d at 233.  
154Id. 
155Id. at 231. 
156Id. 
157Id. This result provides a compelling example of the essential nature that medical 
experts play in medical malpractice litigation.  Without her expert the plaintiff could not 
establish the requisite standard of care, effectively eliminating her claim.   
158Id. at 233.   
159OHIO CONST. art. II, § 28.  The language of the section reads as follows: 
The general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing 
the obligation of contracts; but may, by general laws, authorize courts to carry into 
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argument.  Basing its decision on prior precedent, the Supreme Court held that “R.C. 
2743.43 was not retrospectively applied . . . it was properly applied prospectively, 
since the trial took place after its [the medical expert statute] effective date.”160   
As an initial matter, two limitations on the Court’s decision must be noted.  First, 
the Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation centered on the remedial nature of the 
medical expert statute under Section 28 of Article II, not the conflict between the 
medical statute and Rule 601(D) under Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Second, the plaintiffs in Denicola conceded the procedural nature of 
the medical expert statute.  Thus, the substantive qualities of the statute were never 
argued before the Ohio Supreme Court.161   
While the precedential impact of this decision upon the present analysis may be 
questionable, it is still imperative to note the Ohio Supreme Court’s assumption that 
the medical expert statute “is of a remedial or procedural nature.”162 The impact of 
this conclusion upon the present analysis is uncertain.  However, what influence this 
assumption should have upon the medical expert statute and its interplay among the 
Ohio Rules of Evidence must be negated by the Court’s conclusory dismissal of 
fundamental rights inhering in those suffering from the hands of negligent doctors.   
Any provision that dictates the qualifications of medical experts impacts the 
substantive rights of tort victims in two very real and fundamental ways.  First, any 
law affecting the competence of a medical expert directly impacts a tort victim’s 
ability to obtain a trial by jury.  Second, any law affecting the competence of a 
medical expert directly impacts a tort victim’s ability to gain access to a court of law.  
The result is that rules affecting the competence of medical experts implicate more 
than simply the procedural stance of a medical malpractice victim.  Rules affecting 
the competency of medical experts impact the very essence of an individual’s 
substantive right to pursue complex medical malpractice cases.  Without the ability 
to obtain a medical expert, these tort victims cannot obtain redress in a court of law. 
                                                           
effect, upon such terms as shall be just and equitable, the manifest intention of parties, 
and officers, by curing omissions, defects, and errors, in instruments and proceedings, 
arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of this state. 
Id.  
160Denicola, 387 N.E.2d at 233.  In reaching this holding, the Ohio Supreme Court relied 
upon its prior precedent in State ex rel. Holdridge v. Indus. Comm’n, 228 N.E.2d 621, 623 
(Ohio 1967) (“[I]n general terms, substantive law is that which creates duties, rights, and 
obligations, while procedural or remedial law prescribes methods of enforcement of rights or 
obtaining redress.”). 
161Denicola, 387 N.E.2d at 233.  There is no explanation in this or the lower decision why 
the plaintiff never argued the substantive nature of the medical expert statute.  Most likely this 
decision resulted from the fact that no Rule of Evidence existed at the time to conflict with the 
statute.  
162Id.  For a discussion on the difference between substantive and remedial laws, see 
Kilbreath v. Rudy, 242 N.E.2d. 658, 660 (Ohio 1968) (“Substantive law is that which creates 
duties, rights and obligations, while procedural or remedial law prescribes the methods of 
enforcement of rights or obtaining redress.”). 
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5. The Right to a Jury Trial 
It is a bedrock principal of our justice system that the right to a jury trial is a 
substantive rather than procedural right.163 This privilege cannot be disturbed, 
desecrated, or violated.164  The ancestry of the right to a jury trial can be traced to 
English common law.165  There, the right became enshrined in the Magna Carta and 
transported across the Atlantic with the colonists.166  Here, it flourished and was 
embodied in the Constitution of the United States.167  The right to a jury trial was 
“formally extended to Ohioans [in] the Northwest Ordinance”168 and became 
encapsulated in the Ohio Constitution.169  The right to a jury trial is not simply a 
procedural grant, it is a fundamental right inhering in every citizen.170   
This inalienable right, however, does not exist in every circumstance.  The 
entitlement only manifests itself in those instances when it “existed at common law 
prior to the adoption of” the Ohio Constitution.171  In Sorrell v. Thevenir, the Ohio 
Supreme Court acknowledged that right to a jury trial for negligence litigation 
antedates the Ohio Constitution.172  Thus, the right to a trial by jury for all negligence 
victims is a substantive right that cannot be abridged or circumscribed by any rule of 
court procedure.173  
                                                                
16347 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 9 (2006).  See also Earnest v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Ala., 
494 So. 2d 80, 82 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); Sidenstricker v. Miller Pavement Maint., Inc., 815 
N.E.2d 736, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (“The right to a jury trial is substantive rather than 
procedural.”); Betz v. Timken Mercy Med. Ctr., 644 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. 
1994) (“Fundamental to our justice system is the right to a jury of our peers.”). 
164OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5.  “The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate, except that, in civil 
cases, laws may be passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict by concurrence of not less 
than three-fourths of the jury.” Id; see also Gibbs v. Village of Girard, 102 N.E. 299, (Para. 
two of syllabus Ohio 1913) (finding “[the] right of trial by jury, being guaranteed to all our 
citizens by the constitution of the state, cannot be invaded or violated.”). 
165Belding v. State ex rel. Heifner, 169 N.E. 301, 302 (Ohio 1929) (holding Section 5 of 
article 1 of the Ohio Constitution only guarantees the right of a trial by jury in those instances 
where it existed previous to its adoption). 
166Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday, 188 N.E. 1, 3 (Ohio 1933) (holding that the right to a 
trial by jury is a substantive right, not a procedural matter); see also Wikipedia, Magna Carta, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magna_ Carta  (last visited Nov. 16, 2006). 
167Halliday, 188 N.E. at 3. 
168Kneisley v. Lattimer-Stevens Co., 533 N.E.2d 743, 746 (Ohio 1988) (holding that OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(D) (West 2006) may not be retroactively applied because the right 
to a jury trial for intentional torts existed at common law and is therefore a substantive right).   
169Belding, 169 N.E. at 302; see also Gibbs, 102 N.E. at 300. 
170Halliday, 188 N.E. at 3. 
171Kneisley, 533 N.E.2d at 746; see also Belding, 169 N.E. 301 at syllabus. 
172Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 510 (Ohio 1994) (holding the right to a jury trial in 
negligence and personal injury actions is a fundamental right). 
173Kneisley, 533 N.E.2d at 746. 
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Medical malpractice is a specialized branch of the negligence tree.174  Victims 
who pursue claims under this vein are afforded the same substantive rights and 
protections as any other tort victim.  Unlike traditional tort victims, however, victims 
of medical malpractice are peculiarly reliant upon medical experts to gain access to a 
court of law.175  Medical expert testimony is a fundamental prerequisite to pursuing 
any such claim.176  Without a medical expert to establish the requisite standard of 
care and to establish this, the defendant failed to meet this standard, a plaintiff will 
never reach a jury.177  Any rule, therefore, affecting the competency of a medical 
expert substantially impacts a tort victim’s substantive right to a trial by jury.   
By expanding or contracting a victim’s ability to access a medical expert, rules 
governing the competency of medical experts expand or contract the individual’s 
very right to a trial by jury. The result is that rules regulating medical experts affect 
substantive rights and are not procedural rules.  Because the Ohio Constitution 
prohibits the Supreme Court from promulgating rules affecting substantive rights, 
Rule 601(D) must have no force or affect, and the statute governing medical expert 
testimony must control.  Medical experts should be obligated to devote three-fourths 
of their professional time to the active clinical practice of medicine, as prescribed by 
the medical expert statute. 
6.  Access to the Courts 
Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution guarantees that every citizen “shall 
have a remedy by due course of law” for any injury to land, property, or person.178  
While Ohio uses the unique phrase “due course of law,” the clause has been 
interpreted to be the functional equivalent of the due process clause179 found in the 
                                                                
174See discussion supra Part II, Section A. 
175Id. 
176DOBBS, supra note 33, at 639.  “[C]ourts require the plaintiff to establish the medical 
‘standard’ itself by expert testimony.”  Id.  See, e.g., Brannan v. Lankenau Hosp., 417 A.2d 
196, 199 (Pa. 1980) (“To satisfy his burden of proving [. . . medical malpractice] appellant 
must introduce expert testimony to show that appellee physicians conduct varied from 
accepted medical practice.”). 
177See Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tex. 1965).  
In determining negligence in a case such as this, which concerns the highly specialized 
art of treating disease, the court and jury must be dependent on expert testimony.  
There can be no other guide, and where want of skill and attention is not thus shown 
by expert evidence applied to the facts, there is no evidence of it proper to be 
submitted to the jury. 
Id.  
See also discussion supra Part II, Section A; Cross v. Huttenlocher, 440 A.2d 952, 954 
(Conn. 1981) (“To prevail in a malpractice case the plaintiff must establish through expert 
testimony both the standard of care and the fact that the defendant’s conduct did not measure 
up to that standard.”). 
178OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16.  “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and 
shall have justice administered without denial or delay.” Id.  
179See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.)”  U.S. CONST. amend IV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . 
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United States Constitution.180  There is no difference between the United States and 
the Ohio Constitution regarding due process of law.181   
The Due Process Clause encompasses two distinct limitations upon government 
action, procedural and substantive due process.182  Procedural due process ensures 
that the government provide some form of notice and an adequate opportunity to be 
heard before it deprives a person of life, liberty or property.183  In contrast, 
“substantive due process insists that the law itself be fair and reasonable and have an 
adequate justification regardless of how fair or elaborate the procedures might be for 
implementing it.”184  The rights protected under the substantive strand of the due 
process clause are “independent of any . . . textual guarantee[] found in the 
Constitution.”185  The result is that substantive due process encompasses a much 
broader sweep of liberty interests than procedural due process.   
An eclectic amalgam of rights has emerged over the years under this branch of 
the due process clause,186 from the right to privacy to the right to direct the 
upbringing of one’s child.187  The Supreme Court of the United States has also 
“recognized a limited due process right of access to courts [which is] violated by 
                                                           
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”.)  The Fifth 
Amendment “operates as a limit on the power of the national government, while the 
[Fourteenth Amendment] operates against the power of the states . . . Since both clauses 
operate in essentially the same fashion, albeit against different governmental bodies, [they are 
referred] collectively as the Due Process Clause.” ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, 
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 53 (3d ed. 2004). 
18017 OHIO JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 493. 
181Id. See also State v. French, 73 N.E. 216, 217 (Ohio 1905) (An act protecting fish and 
game declared constitutional under the both Due Process Clauses of the United States and the 
Ohio Constitutions – there is no difference respecting the two clauses); Direct Plumbing 
Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 38 N.E.2d 70, 72 (Ohio 1941) (“The ‘due course of law’ clause 
of Section 16, Article 1 of the Ohio Constitution, has been considered the equivalent of the 
‘due process of law’ clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
182IDES & MAY, supra note 179, at 54. See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 210 (2004).  Procedural due process only requires that 
there be some “fair decision-making process before the government takes some action directly 
impairing a person’s life, liberty or property.” Id.  Substantive due process addresses the 
“constitutionality of the underlying rule rather than the fairness of the process by which the 
government applies the rule to an individual.” Id.  Under this thread of the due process clause 
the Supreme Court examines the substance of the law or governmental action. Id.  
183IDES & MAY, supra note 179, at 54. 
184Id.  Due process originates from England, where it served as a protection from 
“arbitrary action on the part of the Crown.”  16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 911 
(2006).  Beginning in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court began applying due process 
to substantive rights.  Id.   
185IDES & MAY,  supra note 179, at 54. 
186Substantive federal rights can only be created under the federal constitution. 16B AM. 
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 911 (2006).  “[A]s a general matter, the Supreme Court is 
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process, because guideposts for responsible 
decision making in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.”  Id.   
187IDES & MAY, supra note 179, at 54-116. 
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government action that prevents a party from filing a lawsuit.”188  This substantive 
right is implicated by any rule that impacts a litigant’s access to a medical expert in 
malpractice litigation.189 
Right to access court cases typically occur in two general categories.190  The first 
class of cases occurs when a plaintiff’s overtures to litigate a potential claim are 
stymied by some official action that deprives the person of the opportunity to do 
so.191  The second class of cases occurs when some “specific litigation ended poorly, 
or could not have commenced, or could have produced a remedy subsequently 
unobtainable.”192   
                                                                
188Id. at 116. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) (“[D]ue process 
requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, 
persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be 
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 
(2002) (“[T]he very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide some effective 
vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong.”); Bremiller 
v. Cleveland Psychiatric Instit., 879 F.Supp. 782, 792 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (“Access to the courts 
is a substantive due process right”); 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 945 (2006) (“An 
opportunity for a hearing before a competent and impartial tribunal upon proper notice is one 
of the essential elements of due process.”)  See also IDES & MAY, supra note 179, at 54-116. 
Right to access courts claims occur in two basic categories: “(1) those in which the 
government has created an impediment to the present filing of a lawsuit; and (2) those in 
which the government took action in the past that prevented filing a claim that is now 
foreclosed.” Id. at 116. 
189See, e.g., John E. Nowak et al., Constitutional Law § 13.10 (3d ed. 1986).  
If a state law allows persons to bring suit in state court to redress alleged grievances 
against public or private agencies, it cannot arbitrarily deny an individual the ability to 
use those judicial procedures.  The arbitrary refusal to allow individuals to use the 
established state court process would seem to be invalid under even the most minimal 
due process or equal protection standards. 
Id.  
See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) (“The Court 
traditionally has held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in 
the courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to 
redress grievances.”). 
190IDES & MAY, supra note 179, at 116-17.  See also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 
403, 412-14 (2002) (holding that the defendant did not state a claim for denial of judicial 
access). 
191Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413.  The gravamen of such a claim is “that systematic official 
action frustrates a plaintiff . . . in preparing and filing suits at the present time.” Id. The 
impediment presently frustrates the litigant’s ability to enter the court room doors – however it 
does not deny the opportunity to litigate for all time.  Once the impediment is lifted the litigant 
is free to pursue his or her claim.  Id.  The rationale “for recognizing that claim, is to place the 
plaintiff in a position to pursue a separate claim for relief once the frustrating condition has 
been removed.” Id.  Examples of Court-access rights include: providing a law library for a 
prisoner, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); providing a reader for an illiterate 
prisoner, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346-48 (1996); and waiving filing fees that an 
indigent litigant would be unable to pay, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713-14 (1961).   
192Christopher, 536 U.S. at 414. 
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The rationale for either claim is to provide individuals an opportunity to seek 
vindication for injuries and seek “judicial relief for some wrong” that has befallen 
them.193  Regardless of whether the right to access a court claim is forward or 
backward looking, it must be derived from some underlying claim.194  The right to 
access a court is absolutely contingent on a legitimate, principal claim for vitality 
and efficacy.   
An underlying claim exists in malpractice litigation.  In these cases, the principal 
cause of action is negligence inflicted upon the tort victim.   
Rules affecting the competency of a medical expert have the unique affect of 
implicating the substantive right to access a court of law.195  Unlike any other branch 
of negligence, victims of medical malpractice cannot pursue a tort action unless they 
are able to obtain an expert willing to testify on their behalf.196  Any rule that 
eliminates a litigant’s opportunity to access a medical expert has the effect of 
slamming the doors of justice in his or her face.  A medical malpractice action 
cannot be pursued unless this barrier has been removed.  Laws or rules that affect the 
competency of a medical expert implicate more than mere rules of court procedure.  
They implicate the very core of a tort victim’s right to obtain redress by functioning 
as the hinge that opens or closes the doors to a court of law. 
Under Ohio’s Constitutional scheme, the power to promulgate rules that 
implicate substantive rights has been expressly delegated to the legislature, not the 
judiciary.  Ohio’s elected representatives have exercised this prerogative by passing 
the medical expert law.  While it might seem odd that the more stringent rule 
governing the competency of medical experts should control, this does not transfer 
authority to the judiciary.  The medical expert statute supersedes R. 601(D) because 
the rule impermissibly infringes upon the substantive rights of medical malpractice 
litigants.  Physicians must be required to devote three-fourths of their time to the 
active clinical practice of medicine to be considered competent to testify in a medical 
malpractice suit. 
B.  The Same or Substantially Similar Specialty Requirement. 
In 2004, the Ohio legislature appended the medical expert statute, adding the 
requirement that medical experts may only testify against doctors from “the same or 
a substantially similar specialty.”197  This amendment furnishes a further safeguard 
against illegitimate “hired gun” testimony.  Because the Ohio Rules of Evidence are 
devoid of a similar requirement, the legislature appears to have utilized its authority 
under the Ohio Constitution to supplement the procedural rules by grafting an 
additional criterion onto laws governing the competency of medical experts.198   
                                                                
193Id. at 414-15. 
194Id.  
195See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (“[A] state must afford all 
individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due 
Process Clause.”). 
196See Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tex. 1965).  See also discussion supra 
Part II, Section A. 
197Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2743.43(A)(3) (West 2006). 
198Ohio Const. art. IV. 
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This interpretation is consistent with the applicable rules of constitutional 
construction.  Under these rules, courts must endeavor to construe a statute in such a 
way as to avoid any “constitutional infirmit[y].”199  In State v. Keenen, the Ohio 
Supreme Court outlined how this analysis should proceed under Section 5(B) of 
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.200   
When a potential conflict arises between a statute and another rule of evidence, 
the “court is bound to give [the] statute a constitutional construction [rather than] . . . 
one that raises serious questions about the statute’s constitutionality.”201  Justices 
should always seek to adopt the “reading of the statute [that] would avoid any 
constitutional problems.”202   
State ex rel. Thompson further demonstrates the Ohio Supreme Court’s desire to 
interpret statutes in such a way as to avoid any constitutional conflicts with other 
rules of court procedure.203  In that case, the Court refused to construe R.C. 
3109.04(C) in a manner that would create an inconsistency with the Ohio Rules of 
Civil Procedure.204  Following the logic of Keenen, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted 
a “construction that harmonize[d] both the statute and the pertinent rules” of 
procedure.205 
The “same or a substantially similar specialty” provision offers a similar 
opportunity to harmonize the medical expert statute with the Ohio Rules of Evidence 
in order to avoid a constitutional infirmity.  By interpreting this provision as a 
supplemental feature to Rule 601(D), both the statute and the rules of evidence can 
be synchronized in the same manner as the Ohio Supreme Court did in State ex rel. 
Thompson.  As a result, the applicable rules of statutory construction dictate that the 
“same or a substantially similar specialty” provision of the medical expert statute 
must control as a supplemental feature to the Ohio Rules of Evidence.  To find 
otherwise would construe the statute in such a way as to create a constitutional 
infirmity. 
However, before the “same or substantially the same specialty” provision can be 
read into the rules governing the competency of medical experts, several minor 
issues must be explored and explained.  
The first issue concerns the Staff Notes attached to Rule 601(D).  The Staff Notes 
state that the rule as adopted “supersedes R.C. 2743.43.”206  This Note appears to 
                                                                
199State ex rel. Thompson v. Spon, 700 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ohio 1998) (holding that the 
court of appeals was correct in dismissing appellants mandamus claim). 
200State v. Keenen, 689 N.E.2d 929, 946 (Ohio 1998) (holding in part that it refused to 
adopt defendant’s interpretation of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.82 (West 2006).  Because 
such an interpretation would conflict with OHIO R. EVID. 611(B), a rule of court procedure was 
promulgated under Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution).  
201Id.  
202Id.  
203State ex rel. Thompson, 700 N.E.2d at 1284. 
204Id. 
205Id.  
206Ohio R. Evid. 601(D), 1980 staff note. 
2007-08] HARNESSING THE HIRED GUNS 147 
evince the judicial branch’s clear intent to supplant the medical expert statute.  
However, several flaws exist with this interpretation.  
First, the Staff Notes have never been “adopted by the Court and are not 
[considered to be] part of the rule[s].”207  Thus, the Note carries no weight beyond 
mere suggestion.  Second, while the rule may have superseded the language of the 
medical expert statute in its initial formulation, the Ohio legislature subsequently 
appended the statute in 2004, adding the provision in question.  In so doing, the Ohio 
representatives exercised their authority to supplement or complement the rules of 
court procedure with non-contradictory legislation.208  Because the Rules of Evidence 
are silent concerning the competency of medical experts to testify against other 
doctors across medical specialties, the amended medical expert statute does not 
conflict with Rule 601(D).  As a result, the legislature has grafted an additional 
supplemental provision onto the Ohio rules governing the competency of medical 
experts. 
The second issue concerns the final clause in Rule 601(D).209  This clause 
provides that Rule 601(D) shall not prohibit medical experts “who otherwise are 
competent to testify under these rules from giving expert testimony on the 
appropriate standard of care in their own profession,”210 in an action against any 
other physician or medical professional.   
A potential reading could be elicited from this language that the rule empowers 
medical experts to testify against other medical professionals, regardless of their 
specialty.  This reading would directly conflict with the “similar specialty” provision 
of the medical expert statute, which prohibits medical experts from doing just that.211  
However, the judiciary did not intend such a result when they added this language to 
Rule 601(D).   
The Ohio Supreme Court added the final clause to Rule 601(D) in order to 
prohibit the application of the competency rule when medical professionals are 
necessary to testify about the appropriate standard of care within their own field.212  
                                                                
207OHIO R. EVID. 101, Refs & Annos (2006).  
The Supreme Court Advisory Committee prepared the Staff Notes for each of the 
substantive rule amendments . . . Although the Supreme Court used the Staff Notes as 
background for its deliberations, the Staff Notes are not adopted by the Court and are 
not part of the rule . . . [T]he Staff Notes represent the views of the Rules Advisory 
Committee and are not necessarily the views of the Supreme Court.  
Id.  
208OHIO CONST. art. IV. 
209OHIO R. EVID. 601(D).  
This division shall not prohibit other medical professionals who are otherwise 
competent to testify under these rules from giving expert testimony on the appropriate 
standard of care in their own profession in any claim asserted in any civil action 
against a physician, podiatrist, medical professional, or hospital arising out of the 
diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person. 
Id. 
210Id. 
211See supra note 25.  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2743.43(A)(2) (West 2006). 
212OHIO R. EVID. 601(D), 1991 staff note.  See also JAMES T. O’REILLY, OHIO PERSONAL 
INJURY PRACTICE § 14:4 (2006).  “Medical malpractice applies not only to physicians and 
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Prior to the insertion of this language, several courts had held that a nurse could not 
be considered “competent under Rule 601(D) to testify about the standard of” care 
for nurses in malpractice actions against doctors.213  The additional language in Rule 
601(D) prevents this unusual practice from occurring.214 As a result, the final clause 
of Rule 601(D) has no bearing on the competency of a medical expert to testify 
concerning the appropriate standard of care for a physician from a different specialty.  
The language of Rule 601(D) does not conflict with the “same or a substantially 
similar specialty” provision of the medical expert statute.   
Because the appropriate rules of statutory construction dictate an interpretation 
that ensures the constitutionality of the medical expert statutes and because the 
“same or a substantially similar specialty” provision does not conflict with any 
language in Rule 601(D), the provision must supplement the Ohio Rules of 
Evidence.  The Ohio legislature has successfully grafted an additional requirement 
onto the rules of court procedure; medical experts should be prohibited from 
testifying across medical specialties. 
V.  PART V 
  Conclusion 
Dr. Sandu’s story concludes on a positive note.  A unanimous jury exonerated 
him of all wrongdoing.  After the verdict, Dr. Sandu’s lawyer spoke with some of the 
jury members.  They informed the lawyer that they found the plaintiff’s expert to be 
so thoroughly incompetent that they would refuse treatment from him if offered.215    
The jury also stated that they found Dr. Sandu’s conduct exemplified the best 
rules of his profession.216  Dr. Sandu’s account provides a vivid example of why the 
testimony of medical experts must be regulated.  If medicine is to remain a viable 
industry, quality physicians like Dr. Sandu must be insulated from frivolous 
litigation allied with “hired gun” testimony.  Doctors must be protected from 
condemnation by “experts” no longer practicing medicine and testifying in arenas 
outside their areas of expertise.  At the same time, victims of legitimate medical 
mistakes must be provided open avenues to seek redress.  
Ohio has attempted to draw this line with legislation designed to stifle access to 
purchased testimony. This legislation, however, clashes in part with Ohio evidentiary 
rules governing the competency of witnesses.  Whether the legislature has struck the 
proper balance between the interests of physicians and tort victims is far from 
                                                           
surgeons, but also to dentists, chiropractors, podiatrists, optometrists, nurses and hospitals.” Id.  
For a complete list of individuals who may be named as a defendant in a medical malpractice 
action within the state of Ohio, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.113(E) (West 2006).  
213OHIO R. EVID. 601(D), 1991 staff note. See also Harter v. Wadsworth-Rittman Hosp., 
580 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (trial court did not err in finding that a nurse was not 
competent to testify under R. 601(D) in suit alleging negligent provision of medical care by a 
nursing staff).  
214Ohio R. Evid. 601(D), 1991 staff note. 
215Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Cardiovascular Surgeon, in Cleveland, Ohio 
(Oct. 18, 2006). 
216Id. The jury members actually stated that they wanted him to be their physician and 
would recommend his services to any person requiring cardiovascular surgery. Id.  
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certain.217  What is certain is that the authority to ascertain this balance has been 
exclusively delegated to the legislature under the Ohio Constitution.   
Under Article IV, Section 5(B), rules of procedure that impact the substantive 
rights of Ohio citizens are considered far too important to be encroached upon by the 
judiciary.  Rules affecting substantive rights, therefore, have been expressly 
delegated to the legislature.  Because rules that regulate the competency of medical 
experts inevitably encroach upon the ability of a tort victim to seek redress in a court 
of law, such rules impact substantive rights in very real and tangible ways.  As a 
result, the medical expert statute must control.  To find otherwise would permit the 
judiciary to encroach upon the substantive rights of Ohio citizens, something 
expressly prohibited by the Ohio Constitution.  However, even if the medical expert 
statute does not govern, its provision requiring that medical experts practice in the 
same or substantially the same specialty still controls as a supplementary regulation 
to the rules of court procedure permissible under the Ohio Constitution. 
 
                                                                
217Such an inquiry is beyond the reach of this article. 
